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Philosophy and T heology
These reflections focus on the following topics: (1) empirical evaluations ofthe 
efficacy o f  intercessory prayer for recovery o f  health, (2) an argument about poten­
tiality and personhood, and (3) a critique o f  the consistency o f  a pro-life position.
Empirical Evaluations o f the Efficacy o f Intercessory Prayer
As contemporary debates indicate, the relationship o f  religion and science 
remains a contentious one in the minds o f  m any scholars. In a sense, faith— which 
by definition is not simply knowledge— seems opposed to any kind o f  empirical 
justification. Yet at times Scripture itself seems to appeal to empirical justification 
in order to demonstrate the power o f  God. The prophet Elijah challenges the priests 
o f  Baal to pray to their god to set aflame a sacrifice, taunting them  when nothing 
happens that perhaps their god is sleeping. Elijah vindicates his belief in the God 
o f  Abraham when, after prayer, God delivers a fiery consumption o f  the sacrifice 
(1 Kings 18: 20-39).
Scripture enjoins believers to pray for the sick. “Is any among you sick? Let him 
call for the elders [presbyters] o f the Church and let them  pray over him, anointing 
him with oil in the name o f  the Lord; and the prayer o f  faith will save the sick man, 
and the Lord will raise him up” (James 5: 14-15). Is there any empirical evidence 
to suggest that prayer for others does indeed aid them  in regaining health?
In his article, “Just A nother Drug? A Philosophical Assessm ent o f  Random ­
ized Controlled Studies on Intercessory Prayer” (Journal o f  Medical Ethics, August 
2006), philosopher Derek Turner takes up this topic. He appeals to philosophical 
and theological grounds in questioning whether such studies are ethically perm is­
sible, by (1) considering the problems o f  obtaining informed consent from patients 
participating in the studies; (2) noting that intercessors, i f  they act in accordance 
with their religious beliefs, should subvert the studies by praying for patients in the 
control groups; and (3) arguing that intercessors and scientists m ust take incom pat­
ible views o f  the causal relationship between prayer and healing.
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Turner’s article, like a host o f other articles treating the possibility of prayer 
to promote healing,1 raises important questions about empirical demonstrations of 
the power of prayer. One o f Turner’s concerns is that believers have a religious 
obligation to include the control group in their prayers, thereby subverting the 
study. He writes:
Indeed, if I were a Christian recruited to one of the prayer teams, and if an ex­
perimenter asked me to offer specific prayers for several patients assigned to 
the intercessory prayer group, I would have qualms. Surely God cares about the 
suffering of all the patients in the study. Why should I pray for some but not for 
others? Would a good Christian not pray for everyone who is in need? I, at least, 
would be tempted to follow the experimenter’s instructions, and then sneak in an 
extra request at the end, “Please, God, take care of those in the control group, too.”
Of course if the volunteers did this, that would subvert the entire study—but this 
is arguably what the volunteers should do, if they are Christian. (489)
This concern seems misplaced. It is true that Christians have a duty to love ev­
eryone, but this general obligation does not translate into a particular duty to help 
every individual. As Aquinas notes in the Summa theologiae, “absolutely speaking 
it is impossible to do good to every single [person]: yet it is true o f each individual 
that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity 
binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do 
good to anyone if  we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do 
to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, 
for unbelievers as well as for the faithful.”1 2 Just as we have no obligation to donate 
to every single charity (despite our obligation to donate to some particular charity 
if  we have the means), so we have no obligation to pray for every single person 
in particular. In the intercessory experiment, we have no obligation to pray for the 
control group in particular. Praying for people in general, since this would include 
both the control group and the intercessory group equally, does not threaten the 
scientific validity o f the results.
Turner is correct, however, to point out that there may be still other people, 
not officially participating in the study at all, whose prayers render problematic the 
empirical findings. In other words, perhaps relatives or friends o f the control group 
pray for them and in that way corrupt the scientific validity o f the study.
1 The most systematic study of this question of which I am aware is David R. Hodge, 
“A Systematic Review of the Empirical Literature on Intercessory Prayer,” Research on 
Social Work Practice 17.2 (March 2007): 174-187. For a limited sample of the studies 
cited by Turner, see D. A. Mathews, S. M. Marlowe, F. S. MacNutt, “Effects of Intercessory 
Prayer on Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis,” Southern Medical Journal 93.12 (December 
2000): 1177-1186; L. Leibovici, “Effects of Remote, Retroactive Intercessory Prayer on 
Outcomes in Patients with Bloodstream Infection: Randomized Controlled Trial,” British 
Medical Journal 323.7327 (December 22-29, 2001): 1450-1451; R.C. Byrd, “Positive 
Therapeutic Effects of Intercessory Prayer in a Coronary Care Unit Population,” Southern 
Medical Journal 81.7 (July 1988): 826-829.
2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, Q 31.2, reply 1.
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The question o f  measuring empirically the power o f  intercessory prayer faces 
at least two obstacles unnoticed by Turner. The first is that— unlike medications 
that have chemically identical powers— intercessors themselves m ay not be equally 
efficacious in prayer. Scripture and tradition seem to indicate that not all persons 
share equally in sanctity. W hy should we assume that the prayers o f  the devout and 
the lukewarm are equally efficacious? Since it is impossible to measure a person’s 
holiness, it is impossible to control for the variations in the efficacy o f  prayer. In 
addition, even the same person m ay pray on one occasion with more fervor, con­
centration, and self-giving than on another— again, factors which m ay be relevant 
for whether a prayer is granted but which cannot be empirically measured.
Second, it is controversial (and I believe false) to assume that G od’s answering 
o f  prayer works in the same way as a medicine curing a disease. The chemical ef­
ficacy o f  a particular medication does not depend on the free choice o f  an individual. 
By contrast, God freely chooses to grant or not grant a prayer request. God is not 
a divine puppet over whom, through the strings o f  prayer, we can exercise control. 
Rather, whatever it is that God wills, it is not our prayer that makes God act, again 
unlike a medication that makes certain chemical reactions take place. Rather, God 
freely wills to grant certain requests on condition that we pray for them. In other 
words, i f  we believe that God chooses freely or that God is pure actuality with no 
potentiality whatsoever, then prayer cannot exercise a kind o f  causal power over 
God. I f  an orthodox view o f  God is correct, it would seem to follow that one cannot 
measure the efficacy o f  prayer through any empirical test o f  causal effectiveness.
Potentiality and Personhood
Taking on the central issue o f  personhood in “Probability Potentiality” (Cam­
bridge Quarterly o f Healthcare Ethics, April 2007), Christopher Nobbs attempts to 
chart a middle course between those who argue that personhood rests on the poten­
tiality o f  a being to achieve self-awareness, and theorists such as Peter Singer who 
hold that personhood begins sometime after birth when self-awareness is actually 
achieved. Curiously unm entioned are those who disagree with both views, namely, 
those who hold that personhood is contingent upon neither actual self-awareness nor 
potential self-awareness, but rather the rational nature o f  the being in question. On 
this view, even a severely handicapped hum an child with no potentiality to achieve 
self-awareness is still a person.
Nobbs holds that actual persons m ust be self-aware, but also that those who 
are potential persons in his view— such as human babies— have some value because 
they are highly likely to achieve personhood. Just as a lottery ticket with a fifty- 
fifty chance o f  being worth a million dollars is extremely valuable (as calculated 
by rational decision theory, 50 percent x  $1 million = $500,000) but not as valuable 
as one m illion dollars itself, so too the hum an infant is not equal to a person and 
yet is o f  such high value that parents m ay not neglect or kill the child because o f 
the probability that the infant will become a person. W ith the application o f  a kind 
o f  rational decision theory to the question o f  when hum an life becomes valuable, 
Nobbs attempts to maintain the self-awareness view o f  personhood and yet not 
sanction the moral permissibility o f  infant neglect.
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Several difficulties face this proposal. Obviously, the probability o f  an infant 
reaching personhood m ust be conceived independently o f  detrim ental hum an 
intervention. Otherwise, parents could neglect or kill the infant at will, since the 
probability o f  such an infant reaching personhood with the harmful human interven­
tion would be quite low, i f  not zero. I f  harmful hum an choices are excluded from 
the probability, then it is difficult to see why the hum an fetus— from quite early in 
pregnancy— would be m uch different than the hum an newborn. After a pregnancy 
is established, miscarriage— like still-birth or SIDS— is relatively rare, so the human 
fetus would seem to have a high likelihood o f  reaching personhood and so would 
have a high value. This would seem to exclude abortion save for the m ost serious 
o f  reasons; i f  not, then one would have to endorse infanticide for birth control and 
convenience, as takes place in m ost abortions. In other words, i f  potential value is 
going to do the work needed to exclude infant neglect or infanticide, it will also 
exclude m any abortions— presumably a view that Nobbs does not want to embrace, 
given his endorsement o f  something like Singer’s view o f  personhood, a view typ i­
cally driven by the desire to justify abortion.
A nother difficulty is that in any calculus o f  probability and value, both terms 
are relevant. In other words, in terms o f  shifting the outcome, i f  a value is high 
enough, even a low probability yields high probability value. So in adjudicating 
among various options, not simply the probability but also the value involved is 
relevant. Considering negative outcomes, it would be irrational for me to wager even 
with good odds, i f  losing the w ager would result in, say, therm onuclear devastation. 
Put positively, i f  the value o f personhood is high enough, even a low probability 
o f  achieving personhood yields great value, which would again seem to lead to a 
condemnation o f  not ju st infanticide but also abortion. If, as Pope John Paul II states, 
we affirm “the incomparable value o f every hum an person,”3 then this inestimable 
value shifts the probability calculus decidedly against negative interventions on 
hum an life even in the face o f  low probability.
Considered from another perspective, N obbs’s view o f  probability potential­
ity is unlikely to be persuasive grounds for demonstrating the problem atic nature 
o f  infanticide or infant neglect to m any pro-choice advocates. Commenting on 
her own example o f  a space explorer whose body contains virtually millions o f 
potential persons, M ary Anne Warren remarked that the rights o f  an actual person 
always outweigh the rights o f  however m any potential persons.4 I f  so, then it is 
difficult to see w hat practical difference it would make i f  infants (or other human 
beings) have greater value the more likely it is that they are to achieve personhood. 
It would still be permissible for a couple to take a vacation, leaving their newborn 
at home to die from neglect, since the rights and desires o f  actual persons could in 
principle never be outweighed by the rights and desires o f  nonpersons, however 
close to achieving personhood.
3 John Paul II, Evangelium vitae (March 25, 1995), n. 2.
4 Mary Anne Warren, “The Personhood Argument in Favor of Abortion,” in Life and 
Death: A Reader in Moral Problems, 2nd ed., ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wad­
sworth, 2000), 265-266.
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A Critique o f the Consistency o f a Pro-life Position
In his article “Pro-Life is Anti-Life: The Problematic Claims o f  Pro-Life Posi­
tions in Ethics,”5 John Harris, a prom inent consequentialist and editor-in-chief o f  
the Journal o f  Medical Ethics, critiques David Oderberg’s Moral Theory: A Non- 
Consequentialist Approach with rhetorical fireworks characteristically reserved 
for partisan college newspapers.6 Harris describes Oderberg, and the pro-life view 
generally, as tendentious, unprincipled, hollow, hypocritical, and disingenuous. 
Addressing Oderberg’s claim that consequentialism is the dominant approach in 
contemporary applied ethics, Harris retorts, “Obviously Oderberg has never been 
to, or even heard about, such Western countries as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, 
France, Greece, Eire, Poland, Malta, or almost any other country ofW estern Europe 
let alone m ost o f  the United States and South Am erica” (100). Such remarks do not 
contribute to the understanding o f  differences, the clarification o f  important issues, 
or the resolution o f  disagreements.
H arris’s argument against Oderberg in part focuses on cases where adherence 
to an exceptionless norm  against intentionally killing innocent persons leads to 
counterintuitive results. For example, Harris believes that the pro-life view would 
allow the M altese conjoined twins M ary and Jodie to both die rather than saving 
one by killing the other. Or, in another example, it would be forbidden to kill a 
hijacker and his innocent hum an shield to prevent an entire plane from crashing 
and killing all on board.
A more careful study o f  the tradition under criticism indicates a more complex 
picture. It is true that m any Catholics opposed the separation o f Jodie and M ary on 
a num ber o f  grounds,7 but other Catholic commentators,8 m yself included,9 have 
argued that the separation was not intentional killing and was justified according 
to double-effect reasoning (DER). Likewise, scholastics following Aquinas dealt
5 John Harris, “Pro-Life is Anti-Life: The Problematic Claims of Pro-Life Positions 
in Ethics,” in Scratching the Surface o f  Bioethics, eds. Matti Hayry and Tuija Takala (New 
York: Rodopi, 2003): 99-109. Harris writes: “The hollowness of pro-life positions has been 
demonstrated in many ways and it will not be my purpose in this short paper to attempt 
to catalogue the ways in which such positions are so often wantonly destructive of human 
lives and of the value that ‘life’ represents. ... A further dimension of the pro-life position 
that has not received the critical attention its hypocrisy merits is the way in which a pro-life 
position does not in fact embody an uncompromising and principled stand against killing, but 
instead is the articulation and defense of a particular set of justifications for killing normal 
human beings” (100, 102).
6 David Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-ConsequentialistApproach (Oxford: Black­
well, 2000).
7 For example, Archbishop Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, “The Conjoined Twins Mary 
and Jodie: Ethical Analysis of their Case,” Origins 30.17 (October 5, 2000): 269-272.
8 For example, William E. May, “‘Jodie’ and ‘Mary’: Separating the Maltese Twins,” 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 1.3 (Autumn 2001): 407-416.
9 See Christopher Kaczor, The Edge o f Life: Human Dignity and Contemporary Bio­
ethics (New York: Springer, 2005), ch. 8.
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explicitly with cases o f attackers making use of human shields, and some held that 
one can defend oneself with lethal force even in such cases. Similarly, I believe that 
DER would permit shooting down hijacked aircraft that are being used as missiles, 
despite the loss of life for innocent passengers on board.
Harris misunderstands double-effect reasoning in another way: “It is a clas­
sic paradox o f Catholic theology or any philosophy that employs the doctrine of 
double effect that since no one may intend to kill a protected individual those that 
do not intend to kill protected individuals are in fact permitted to do so. ... It is 
open season on indirect killing” (103, 106). In fact, double-effect reasoning involves 
more than simply the requirement that an agent not intend, as a means or an end, 
to intentionally kill the innocent. In addition, “indirect killing” is justified only if  
there is also a proportionately serious reason for allowing the side effect o f death, 
such as defending innocent human life. DER simply does not allow “open season” 
for indirect killing.
Finally, since Catholic tradition sanctions the use o f the death penalty and 
private self-defense, Harris construes the pro-life position as holding that, “no lives 
are intrinsically valuable—valuable because they are lives o f a particular sort of 
creature, the lives of human beings instead o f animals, as it is sometimes put, o f a 
special ‘natural kind.’ We find that pro-life philosophy does not identify a class of 
beings whose lives are intrinsically important” (103). The pro-life position, in other 
words, is only pro-innocent life, and hence is inconsistent.
This critique again misrepresents its target. In Catholic theology, as John 
Paul II’s Evangelium vitae makes clear, all human beings—without any exception 
whatsoever—have dignity because they are endowed by God with a soul, because 
they can be redeemed by God, and because they have an eternal destiny. Tradi­
tional affirmations o f the right o f the state to perform capital punishment are in no 
sense a denial o f the goodness or dignity o f the life o f the condemned. Just as a 
fine presupposes the value o f money, and imprisonment presupposes the value of 
liberty, so too capital punishment deprives a wrongdoer of something valuable and 
good—his own life. In cases o f self-defense, on my reading o f the text at least,10 
Aquinas taught that one may not intend to kill the attacker but merely to stop the 
attack precisely because o f the intrinsic value o f the attacker’s life. To assert that 
one may use whatever force is necessary to stop an attack and preserve one’s own 
life is not to assert that the attacker’s life is worthless. Left out o f Harris’s critique 
entirely are efforts of the “new natural law” advocates, led by Germain Grisez, to 
make the consistency of the Catholic tradition even more evident.
Christopher Kaczor, Ph .D.
The Catholic University o f America 
Washington, D.C.
10 Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II, Q 64.7. See also Christopher Kaczor, “Double­
Effect Reasoning: From Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer,” Theological Studies 59 (June 
1998): 297-316.
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